Alex Cukierman

Tel-Aviv University
School of Economics
Tel-Aviv 69978

E-Mail: alexcuk@post.tau.ac.il
Institutional Affiliation: Tel Aviv University

NBER Working Papers and Publications

December 1989Seigniorage and Political Instability
with Sebastian Edwards, Guido Tabellini: w3199
The importance of seignorage relative to other sources of government revenue differs markedly across countries. The main theoretical implication of this paper is that countries with more unstable and polarized political systems rely more heavily on seignorage. This result is obtained within the context of a political model of tax reform. The model implies that the more unstable and polarized the political system, the more inefficient is the equilibrium tax structure (in the sense that tax collection is more costly to administer), and the higher therefore, the reliance on seignorage. This prediction of the model is tested on cross-section data for 79 countries. It is found that, after controlling for other variables, political instability significantly contributes to explain the fraction of...

Published: Cukierman, Alex, Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini. "Seigniorage And Political Instability," American Economic Review, 1992, v82(3), 537-555. citation courtesy of

December 1987The Politics of Ambiguity
with Alberto Alesina: w2468
Politicians have generally two motives: they wish to hold office as long as possible and wish to implement their preferred policies. Thus they face a trade-off between the policies which maximize their choices of reelection and their most preferred policies (or the policies most preferred by the constituency which they represent). This paper analyzes this trade-off in a dynamic electoral model in which the voters are not fully informed about the preferences of the incumbent. First, we show that in general there is incomplete policy convergence: the incumbent follows a policy which is intermediate between the other party ideal policy and his own ideal policy. Second, we show that under some circumstances, the incumbent has an incentive to choose procedures which make it more difficult for v...

Published: Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 105, no. 4 (1990): 829-850. citation courtesy of

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