No contact information is available for this researcher.
|The MFA Paradox: More Protection and More Trade? |
in The Political Economy of American Trade Policy, Anne O. Krueger, editor
|Import Protection for U.S. Textiles and Apparel: Viewed from the Domestic Perspective|
in The Political Economy of Trade Protection, Anne O. Krueger, editor
|The MFA Paradox: More Protection and More Trade?|
with : w4751
The textile industry's political power stemmed from its importance in southern states plus the power of the Southern delegation in the U.S. Congress in the 1960s. The strongest resistance to the industry's pressure for protection came from the foreign policy interests of the Executive branch. A constellation of influences explains why negotiated, or voluntary export restraints (VERs), sanctioned by international agreements (the Multi-Fiber Arrangement) was the form protection took. First, the Japanese industry, at the time the world's leading textile exporter, already in the 1930s had exhibited a willingness to accept negotiated agreements to trade disputes. Second, the U.S. Executive, having been a leader in establishing the GATT system to control the sort of unilateral restrictive ac...
Published: The Political Economy of American Trade Policy, Anne O. Krueger ed.pp. 197-254, (University of Chicago Press, 1996).
|The Industry-Country Incidence of "Less than Fair Value" Cases in US Import Trade|
in Export Diversification and the New Protectionism: The Experiences of Latin America, Werner Baer and Malcolm Gillis, editors