Institutional Affiliation: Cornell University
|The Real Effects of Modern Information Technologies|
with , : w27529
Modern information technologies have greatly facilitated timely dissemination of information to a broad base of investors at low costs. To examine their effects on the real economy, we exploit the staggered implementation of the EDGAR system from 1993 to 1996 as a shock to information dissemination technologies. We find that the EDGAR implementation leads to an increase in the level of corporate investment but a decrease in the investment-to-price sensitivity. We provide evidence that improved equity financing and reduced managerial learning from prices are the underlying mechanisms that explain these real effects, respectively. In addition, we show that the EDGAR implementation leads to an improvement in performance in value firms but a decline in performance in high-growth firms where le...
|The Effect of Managers on Systematic Risk|
with , : w27487
Tracking the movement of top managers across firms, we document the importance of manager-specific fixed effects in explaining heterogeneity in firm exposures to systematic risk. These differences in systematic risk are partially explained by managers’ corporate strategies, such as their preferences for internal growth and financial conservatism. Managers’ early-career experiences of starting their first job in a recession also contribute to differential loadings on systematic risk. These effects are more pronounced for smaller firms. Overall, our results suggest that managerial styles have important implications for asset prices.
|Sharing Risk with the Government: How Taxes Affect Corporate Risk Taking|
with , : w21834
Using 113 staggered changes in corporate income tax rates across U.S. states, we provide evidence on how taxes affect corporate risk-taking decisions. Higher taxes reduce expected profits more for risky projects than for safe ones, as the government shares in a firm’s upside but not in its downside. Consistent with this prediction, we find that risk taking is sensitive to taxes, albeit asymmetrically: the average firm reduces risk in response to a tax increase (primarily by changing its operating cycle and reducing R&D risk) but does not respond to a tax cut. We trace the asymmetry back to constraints on risk taking imposed by creditors. Finally, tax loss-offset rules moderate firms’ sensitivity to taxes by allowing firms to partly share downside risk with the government.
Published: ALEXANDER LJUNGQVIST & LIANDONG ZHANG & LUO ZUO, 2017. "Sharing Risk with the Government: How Taxes Affect Corporate Risk Taking," Journal of Accounting Research, vol 55(3), pages 669-707. citation courtesy of
|Shaped by Booms and Busts: How the Economy Impacts CEO Careers and Management Styles|
with : w17590
We show that economic conditions when managers enter the labor market have long-run effects on their career paths and managerial styles. Managers who began their careers during recessions become CEOs more quickly, but at smaller firms. They also have more conservative styles, such as lower investment in capital expenditures and research and development, more cost cutting, and lower leverage and working capital needs. These recession effects appear to be largely driven by the characteristics of the CEO’s first job (recession CEOs tend to start in smaller or private firms), which suggests that the early work environment is important to the formation and selection of managers.
Published: The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 30, Issue 5, 1 May 2017, Pages 1425–1456