Institutional Affiliation: Goethe University
|Do Bank Insiders Impede Equity Issuances?|
with , : w27442
We evaluate the role of insider ownership in shaping banks’ equity issuances in response to the global financial crisis. We construct a unique dataset on the ownership structure of U.S. banks and their equity issuances and discover that greater insider ownership leads to less equity issuances. Several tests are consistent with the view that bank insiders are reluctant to reduce their private benefits of control by diluting their ownership through equity issuances. Given the connection between bank equity and lending, the results stress that ownership structure can shape the resilience of banks—and hence the entire economy—to aggregate shocks.
|Does the Geographic Expansion of Bank Assets Reduce Risk?|
with , : w20758
We develop a new identification strategy to evaluate the impact of the geographic expansion of bank holding company (BHC) assets across U.S. metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) on BHC risk. We find that the geographic expansion of bank assets reduces risk. Moreover, geographic expansion reduces risk more when BHCs expand into economically dissimilar MSAs, i.e., MSAs with different industrial structures and business cycles. We do not find that geographic diversification improves loan quality. Our results are consistent with arguments that geographic expansion lowers risk by reducing exposure to idiosyncratic local risks and inconsistent with arguments that geographic expansion, on net, increases risk by reducing the ability of BHCs to monitor loans and manage risks.
|The Valuation Effects of Geographic Diversification: Evidence from U.S. Banks|
with , : w17660
This paper assesses the impact of the geographic diversification of bank holding company (BHC) assets across the United States on their market valuations. Using two novel identification strategies based on the dynamic process of interstate bank deregulation, we find that exogenous increases in geographic diversity reduce BHC valuations. These findings are consistent with the view that geographic diversity makes it more difficult for shareholders and creditors to monitor firm executives, allowing corporate insiders to extract larger private benefits from firms.
Published: “Identifying the Valuation Effects and Agency Costs of Corporate Diversification: Evidence from the Geographic Diversification of U.S. Banks” (with Martin Goetz and Luc Laeven), Review of Financial Studies, 2013, 26(7): 1787-1823.