Oren Bar-Gill

New York University School of Law
40 Washington Square South, 411B
New York, NY 10012
Tel: (212) 998-6222
Fax: (212) 995-4590

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Institutional Affiliation: New york University

NBER Working Papers and Publications

July 2007Consent and Exchange
with Lucian A. Bebchuk: w13267
In some cases, the law permits a party that unilaterally provides a benefit to another party to recover the estimated value of this benefit. Despite calls for expanding the set of cases to which such a restitution rule applies, the law commonly applies a mutual consent rule under which a party providing another with a benefit cannot obtain any recovery without securing the advance consent of the beneficiary to the transaction. We provide an efficiency rationale for the undesirability of broad use of the restitution rule by identifying significant adverse ex ante effects of the rule that are avoided by the consent requirement. Even assuming that courts' errors in estimating buyer benefits would be unbiased, a restitution rule would strengthen sellers' hand by providing them with a put optio...

Published: Bar-Gill, Oren and Bebchuk, Lucian A., Consent and Exchange (2007). Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 590; Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 39, pp. 375-397, 2010

September 2002The Market for Corporate Law
with Michal Barzuza, Lucian Bebchuk: w9156
This paper develops a model of the competition among states in providing corporate law rules. The analysis provides a full characterization of the equilibrium in this market. Competition among states is shown to produce optimal rules with respect to issues that do not have a substantial effect on managers' private benefits but not with respect to issues (such as takeover regulation) that substantially affect these private benefits. We analyze why a Dominant state such as Delaware can emerge, the prices that the dominant state will set and the profits it will make. We also analyze the roles played by legal infrastructure, network externalities, and the rules governing incorporations. The results of the model are consistent with, and can explain, existing empirical evidence; they also indica...

Published: Oren Bar-Gill & Michal Barzuza & Lucian Bebchuk, 2006. "The Market for Corporate Law," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 162(1), pages 134-160, March. citation courtesy of

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