Institutional Affiliation: Federal Reserve Bank of New York
|The Economics of Bank Supervision|
with , : w22201
We study bank supervision by combining a theoretical model distinguishing supervision from regulation and a novel dataset on work hours of Federal Reserve supervisors. We highlight the trade-offs between the benefits and costs of supervision and use the model to interpret the relation between supervisory efforts and bank characteristics observed in the data. More supervisory resources are spent on larger, more complex, and riskier banks. However, hours increase less than proportionally with bank size, suggesting the presence of technological scale economies in supervision. The data also show reallocation of supervisory hours at times of stress and in the post-2008 enhanced supervisory framework for large banks, providing evidence of constraints on supervisory resources. Finally, we show th...
|Macroeconomics with Financial Frictions: A Survey|
with , : w18102
This article surveys the macroeconomic implications of financial frictions. Financial frictions lead to persistence and when combined with illiquidity to non-linear amplification effects. Risk is endogenous and liquidity spirals cause financial instability. Increasing margins further restrict leverage and exacerbate downturns. A demand for liquid assets and a role for money emerges. The market outcome is generically not even constrained efficient and the issuance of government debt can lead to a Pareto improvement. While financial institutions can mitigate frictions, they introduce additional fragility and through their erratic money creation harm price stability.
Published: “Macroeconomics with Financial Frictions: A Survey” (with Thomas Eisenbach and Yuliy Sannikov), in Daron Acemoglu, Manuel Arellano and Eddie Dekel (eds.), Advances in Economics and Econometrics, Tenth World Congress of the Econometric Society, Vol. II: Applied Economics, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2013, pp. 4-94.