Walter Novaes


E-Mail: novaes@econ.puc-rio.br
Institutional Affiliation: PUC-Rio

NBER Working Papers and Publications

June 2003Bureaucracy as a Mechanism to Generate Information
with Luigi Zingales: w9763
Firms that maintain no formal record of actions and events would hardly be considered well managed. Yet, organizations that require the recording of actions and the filing of reports are often labeled bureaucratic' and inefficient. This paper argues that the thin line between efficient management practices and inefficient bureaucracy is crossed to curb managerial agency costs in a multi-layer hierarchy. The model predicts that bureaucracy increases with the frequency of managerial turnover, and it establishes a link between bureaucracy, incentive schemes, and leverage in a cross-section of firms.

Published: Novaes, Walter and Luigi Zingales. "Bureaucracy as a Mechanism to Generate Information." RAND Journal of Economics 35, 2 (Summer 2004): 245-59. citation courtesy of

December 1995Capital Structure Choice when Managers are in Control: Entrenchment versus Efficiency
with Luigi Zingales: w5384
Recent capital structure theories have emphasized the role of debt in minimizing the agency costs that arise from the separation between ownership and control. In this paper we argue that capital structure choices themselves are affected by the same agency problem. We show that, in general, the shareholders' and the manager's capital structure choices differ not only in their levels, but also in their sensitivities to the cost of financial distress and taxes. We argue that only the managerial perspective can explain why firms are generally reluctant to issue equity, why they issue it only following a stock price run-up, and why Corporate America recently deleveraged under the same tax system that supposedly generated the increase in leverage in the 1980s.

Published: Walter Novaes, 2003. "Capital Structure Choice When Managers Are in Control: Entrenchment versus Efficiency," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76(1), pages 49-82, January. citation courtesy of

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