Yan Zhang

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
250 E Street, SW
Washington D.C. 20219

E-Mail: EmailAddress: hidden: you can email any NBER-related person as first underscore last at nber dot org
Institutional Affiliation: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

NBER Working Papers and Publications

March 2014Holdup by Junior Claimholders: Evidence from the Mortgage Market
with Sumit Agarwal, Gene Amromin, Itzhak Ben-David, Souphala Chomsisengphet: w20015
When borrowers are delinquent, senior debtholders prefer liquidation whereas junior debtholders prefer to maintain their option value by delaying resolution or modifying the loan. In the mortgage market, a conflict of interest (“holdup”) arises when servicers of securitized senior liens are also the owners of the junior liens on the same property. We show that holdup servicers are able to delay action on the first-lien mortgage. When they do act, servicers are more likely to choose resolutions that maintain their option value, favoring modification and soft foreclosures over outright foreclosures. Holdup behavior is more likely to result in borrower self-curing.

Published: Sumit Agarwal & Gene Amromin & Itzhak Ben-David & Souphala Chomsisengphet & Yan Zhang, 2019. "Holdup by Junior Claimholders: Evidence from the Mortgage Market," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, vol 54(01), pages 247-274. citation courtesy of

National Bureau of Economic Research
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